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 “Please, Draw Me a Field of 
Jurisdiction”: Regulating Securities, 
Securing Federalism 
Jean Leclair* 
[L]ittle thought has been given to the possibility that the main problem 
in a federal state may no longer be so much how to divide powers over 
entire policy fields but how to allocate different tasks within one and 
same policy field. 
  Thomas O. Hueglin** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Antoine de St-Exupéry’s famous story The Little Prince,1 an avia-
tor makes a crash landing in the middle of the Sahara desert and there 
encounters the main character, a child originating from a distant planet. 
On first meeting the aviator, without a word of introduction, the Little 
Prince asks him bluntly to draw him a sheep. Somewhat disconcerted, 
the aviator acquiesces and tries his best to satisfy the child. He pens a 
very sketchy silhouette of what he hopes will pass for a sheep. But the 
Little Prince is not satisfied: “This one is already quite sick. Make an-
other.” The aviator tries again. Another failure. “[T]hat’s not a sheep, it’s 
a ram. It has horns,” says his newfound friend. And again the aviator ap-
plies himself at drawing a suitable sheep. However, this time the sheep is 
said to be too old. His patience tried, the aviator finally draws a box and 
says to the Little Prince: “This is just the crate. The sheep you want is 
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inside.” To his surprise, the child beams with joy and says: “That’s just 
the kind I wanted.” 
Drawing with precision the breadth of a power over “general regula-
tion of trade”2 under section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 18673 is a 
most daunting task. It is much easier simply to draw a conceptual box 
whose contours are so obscure and vague that one can find in it exactly 
what he wants when he wants it.  
 As I will try to demonstrate, notwithstanding that there are good rea-
sons to argue that this power cannot serve as a basis for the recognition 
of a federal authority to regulate the securities market, I do believe that 
the Supreme Court of Canada will resort to it as a peg on which to hang 
the central government’s securities hat.4 The challenge the high court will 
then face will be in establishing limits to the reach of such a power. This 
article intends to focus on that particular problem.5  
As we will see, the case law makes it quite difficult to calibrate the 
breadth of a power, once it has been recognized. This is especially so 
where the GRT power is invoked. The test designed to delimit this field 
of jurisdiction is so abstruse, more so in fact than tests delimiting the ex-
tent of other heads of power, that the door is open to results that have 
more to do with ideological convictions than with the empirical reality of 
the securities market in Canada.  
If the federal structure of the Canadian state and, paradoxically, the 
divided nature of our common market, are to be taken seriously into ac-
count, the challenge then lies in allowing both the central government 
and the provinces a legitimate and guaranteed space in the regulation of 
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 Hereinafter “GRT”. 
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 This paper will not examine whether the “national interest” doctrine founded on Parlia-
ment’s residuary power could justify the recognition of a federal authority to regulate the securities 
market. Since the said doctrine confers an exclusive and permanent jurisdiction over both the inter-
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securities. The recognition of a space for provinces entails the rejection 
of constitutional approaches that would make it possible for Parliament 
to claim a jurisdiction over the entire field of securities — either directly 
by way of an all-encompassing exclusive power over such a matter or 
indirectly by way of a limited exclusive power buttressed by an ancillary 
power allowing a federal encroachment over provincial spheres of juris-
diction. The only solution, one by the way that stands little chance of 
success, would be to confine federal jurisdiction over securities to mat-
ters that provinces have proved unable to address, that is, matters having 
a strictly interprovincial or international character. 
After underlining the fragile empirical basis of many arguments in 
favour of a unified federal securities regime (II), I intend to describe how 
the division of powers has been judicially apprehended in recent years, 
particularly in commercial and economic matters (III). I will then discuss 
how our current understanding of such division of powers constitutes a 
next to insurmountable obstacle to the preservation of an unassailable 
provincial sphere of intervention over securities if, indeed, the Supreme 
Court invokes the GRT power as the basis of a valid federal intervention 
in that field (IV). Finally, I will examine how a true federal spirit might 
inspire a less Manichean approach to the regulation of securities (V).6  
II. THE QUESTIONABLE EMPIRICAL BASIS JUSTIFYING THE  
ENTHUSIASTIC EMBRACE OF A FEDERAL MONOPOLY OVER  
SECURITIES REGULATION 
I am not a specialist in matters of securities regulation. Be that as it 
may, many informed actors in that field do question the empirical valid-
ity of a great number of factual statements forming the basis of 
arguments levelled against the present provincial securities regulatory 
system. 
Although some do recognize advantages to provincial regulation, 
most critics of the present system7 essentially emphasize the following 
                                                                                                             
6
 On the notion of “federal spirit”, see Jean Leclair, “Forging a True Federal Spirit — Re-
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three lacunae.8 First, the present structure of regulation based on the 
“passport system” is said to be too fragmented, requiring decisions to be 
coordinated across up to 13 jurisdictions, thus making it difficult for pro-
vincial securities regulators to react quickly and decisively to capital 
market events. Second, this system is claimed to be incongruent with the 
national response required to address developments in capital markets 
that are increasingly national and international in scope. In other words, 
it is unable to manage systemic risk. In fact, some critics seem to argue 
for a federal jurisdiction not only over securities but also over all finan-
cial sector regulators in Canada so as to manage risk in a proactive, 
collaborative and effective manner.9 Third, it is claimed that, by misallo-
cating resources — these having to be allocated to 13 separate securities 
regulators — the provincial passport system causes securities regulation 
to be less efficient and also too costly since redundancy engenders dupli-
cation which itself results in unnecessary costs, overstaffing and delays. 
Last, some critics appear to be partially fuelled by a possible “race to the 
bottom” between provincial jurisdictions.10  
In a series of very exhaustive studies, authors such as Cédric Sabbah, 
Jean-Marc Suret and Cécile Carpentier, the last two working under the ae-
gis of the Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des 
organisations (“CIRANO”), radically questioned the empirical founda-
tions of the above mentioned criticisms.11 In case anyone should think that 
                                                                                                             
Securities Regulator”]; Crawford Panel on a Single Canadian Securities Regulator, One Year On: 
Seeing the Way Forward (June 2007), online: <http://www.crawfordpanel.ca/OneYearOn.pdf>; 
Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Creating an Advantage in Global Capital Markets — Final 
Report and Recommendations [hereinafter “Hockin Report”], January 2009, online: <http://www. 
expertpanel.ca/eng/reports/index.html>. 
8
 Hockin Report, id., at 40.  
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 Id., at 40 and 49. See also David Laidler, Grasping the Nettles — Clearing the Path to 
Financial Services Reform in Canada, C.D. Howe Institute, Commentary, no 238, 2006, online: 
<http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_238.pdf>. 
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 The Wise Persons, supra, note 7, at 49. 
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 Jean-Marc Suret & Cécile Carpentier, Canadian Securities Regulation: Issues and Chal-
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dian Securities Regulation: Issues and Challenges”]; Jean-Marc Suret & Cécile Carpentier, 
Securities Regulation in Canada, Commission des valeurs mobilières du Québec, 2003RP-12, 2003, 
online: <http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2003RP-12.pdf> [hereinafter “Suret & Carpentier, 
Securities Regulation in Canada”]; Cédric Sabbah, Fédéralisme, concurrence intergouvernementale 
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1/11741805.pdf> [hereinafter “Sabbah”]; and Cécile Carpentier & Jean-Marc Suret, Proposal for a 
Single Securities Commission: Comments and Discussion, 2009RP-05, September 2009, online: 
<http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2009RP-05.pdf> [hereinafter “Carpentier & Suret, Pro-
posal for a Single Securities Commission”]. As for the Autorité des marchés financiers du Québec, 
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these authors’ studies are based on a purely “quebecocentrist” perspective, 
their work, it must be emphasized, is based upon an “interjurisdictional 
competition” theoretical perspective that has generated a vast literature in 
the field of economy.12 
In a preamble to one of their studies, Suret and Carpentier went so 
far as to assert that  
Canadian economic and regulatory policy decisions have more often 
than not been guided by myths put forward by pressure groups rather 
than by actual knowledge resulting from rigorous, independent 
research. It is disturbing to realize that some are considering reforming 
a system which has not been analyzed carefully, on the basis of 
assertions made primarily by pressure groups.13  
Recognizing that ameliorations are certainly possible and that mutual 
recognition could not see the light of day without a willingness to har-
monize rules, these authors demonstrate, with convincing data, that no 
empirical evidence exists proving that the current regulatory structure 
disadvantages Canadian issuers14 or that it constitutes an obstacle to the 
development of solutions tailored to the financing of growth compa-
nies.15 As to costs, the authors underline that 
[f]our studies show that the cost of initial offerings is significantly 
lower in Canada than in the United States, which does not have 
multiple securities commissions. The process for an initial offering is 
not only less costly in Canada, it is also more rapid. It is thus difficult 
to argue that the existence of several securities authorities in Canada 
heavily penalizes the competitiveness of the primary securities market, 
                                                                                                             
its opinion is detailed in an eloquently entitled document: Single Regulator: A Needless Proposal, 
Brief Submitted to the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, July 2008, online: <http://www. 
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 To name but a few authors referred to in the above mentioned studies: Albert Breton, 
Competitive Governments — An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); Daphne A. Kenyon, “Theories of Interjuridictional Competi-
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M. Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure” (1956) 64 J. of Pol. Ec. 416 and Richard H.K. 
Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1994). 
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 Suret & Carpentier, Canadian Securities Regulation: Issues and Challenges, supra, note 
11, at 5. 
14
 Id., at 27. 
15
 Carpentier & Suret, Proposal for a Single Securities Commission, supra, note 11, at 49. 
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especially since in both countries brokerage commissions constitute the 
greater share of total direct costs.16 
Furthermore, since centralization is always presented as a panacea, 
especially as it could curb the “race to the bottom” between provinces 
that regulatory competition is said to generate, Suret and Carpentier 
demonstrate that in fact “a race to the top and not to the bottom exists in 
the securities field where, traditionally, the most exacting jurisdictions 
have attracted a greater number of issuers and investors”.17 
Insistence on centralization as the only solution to the problems fac-
ing the present regulatory system also presumes that harmonization and 
uniformity are always the best paths toward efficiency. First, this posture 
minimizes the harmonization efforts already deployed by the Canadian 
Securities Administrators since 1997.18 Second and most importantly, it 
seems far from evident that perfect harmonization or uniformity may 
even be the most desirable paths toward efficiency. Suret and Carpentier 
underline, more so than any of the proponents of centralization, the het-
erogeneous nature of the Canadian securities market, one characterized 
by diversity in terms of types of companies and provincial initiatives,19 
so much so that, according to these authors, it would be preferable to re-
fer to “a group of markets rather than [to] a single market”.20 Third, to 
say the least, empirical evidence concerning the success of the United 
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 Suret and Carpentier, Canadian Securities Regulation: Issues and Challenges, supra, 
note 11, at 12. 
17
 Id., at 17. Kathryn Harrison, “Are Canadian Provinces Engaged in a Race to the Bottom? 
Evidence and Implications” in Kathryn Harrison, ed., Racing to the Bottom? Provincial Interde-
pendence in the Canadian Federation (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), 257) examined empirical 
evidence of interprovincial competition, and came to the conclusion that “provinces within the Ca-
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that “competition for investment and to avoid benefit claimants has not decimated the provinces’ 
capacity to govern” (at 269). The author stressed, however, that “it is premature to lay to rest the 
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these associated themselves to form the Canadian Securities Administrators. The latter has the man-
date of protecting Canadian investors and the general public. 
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 Suret & Carpentier, Securities Regulation in Canada, supra, note 11, at 68:  
Diversity of the Canadian securities market is revealed by the characteristics of compa-
nies on one hand and provincial initiatives on the other. Small western businesses have 
little in common with those at the heart of the Ontario economy, which are also different 
from medium-sized businesses central to the Quebec economy. Moreover, independence 
with respect to securities has been used by various provinces to initiate programs meeting 
the needs of their respective customers — companies and investors. 
20
 Suret and Carpentier, Canadian Securities Regulation: Issues and Challenges, supra, 
note 11, at 15 and 17-18; and Suret & Carpentier, Securities Regulation in Canada, supra, note 11, 
at 68-73. 
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States’21 or Australia’s22 system, does not convincingly establish the su-
periority of national securities commissions.  
I might add that the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (“OECD”) has ranked Canada’s securities regulatory sys-
tem as the second best in the developed world, just after New Zealand, 
and ahead of the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s centralized 
systems.23 
Having thus shaken the empirical foundations of many arguments in 
favour of centralization, the abovementioned authors engage in a critical 
analysis of the strengths of the present system. For instance, the latter 
allows for multiple experimentations whereas a national system is struc-
turally limited to one experience at a time.24 This diversity of 
experimentation limits the costs of failure to one single jurisdiction and 
not to the whole country.25 A decentralized system is more responsive 
                                                                                                             
21
 In the conclusion of one of their studies, Suret & Carpentier, Proposal for a Single Secu-
rities Commission, supra, note 11, at 49 state that, in Canada,  
[t]he direct costs of offerings are lower than those in the United States for offerings of the 
same size, time frames are shorter than those in the United States and, in particular, the 
cost of financing for small issuers, measured by the returns earned by investors, is fa-
vourable to issuers. These market characteristics provide issuers with a considerably 
higher life expectancy at the time of an offering than that observed for offerings by more 
mature companies in other countries, including the United States. Improvements are cer-
tainly possible, but it is difficult to argue that the existing regulatory structure has been an 
obstacle to the development of solutions tailored to the financing of growth companies. 
The experts mandated by the Panel [Crawford Panel on a Single Canadian Securities 
Regulator, supra, note 7] emphasized the importance of taking steps to reduce the cost of 
corporate financing. We have shown that, in general, this cost is identical to that in the 
United States. For issuers, it seems abnormally favourable, especially in the case of 
growth companies.  
See also Sabbah, supra, note 11, at 49-50. 
22
 Suret & Carpentier, Securities Regulation in Canada, supra, note 11, at 6, 14, 37 and 53; 
Carpentier & Suret, Proposal for a Single Securities Commission, supra, note 11, at 13 and 47; and 
Sabbah, supra, note 11, at 9-10, 18-20 and 50. 
23
 Economic Policy Reforms Going for Growth, 2006, Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development, 2006, at 126. The document mentions (id., at 127) that this ranking was 
based on the following detailed empirical study: Alain De Serres, et al., “Regulation of Financial 
Systems and Economic Growth” (August 2006). OECD Working Paper No. 506. Available online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=965693>. However, in a more recent document (Economic Survey of 
Canada, 2008, Policy Brief, OECD, June 2008 at 4 — <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/27/ 
40811541.pdf> it is stated that “[t]he current diversity of regulations [in Canada] — for example, 
each province has its own securities regulator — makes it difficult to maximise efficiency, and in-
creases the risk that firms will choose to issue securities in other countries. A single regulator would 
eliminate the inefficiencies created by the limited enforcement authority of individual provincial 
agencies.” (emphasis in original) Then again, it must be underlined that, contrary to the conclusions 
of the 2006 document that were based on extensive empirical data, not a shred of evidence is pro-
vided to buttress this claim. 
24
 Sabbah, supra, note 11, at 41 and 45. 
25
 Id., at 41. 
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than a national one to problems that only affect subgroups of the national 
industry.26 A national system might not be as sensitive as a decentralized 
one to local sensibilities.27 Furthermore, since an important objective of 
securities regulation is investor protection, and since it must be acknowl-
edged that investors are always situated “somewhere” in one province or 
another, hence, it must be admitted that investigations and enforcement 
of breaches to securities regulation always involve a local dimension. It 
can therefore be argued that investor protection through enforcement can 
be better served by provincial regulators who act in an institutional and 
cultural environment they are more familiar with.28 And even though 
some proposals advocate a federal “model includ[ing] a local presence 
through regional and district offices”,29 the very structure of a national 
system requires that compromises be devised, compromises that are 
bound to ignore the more local voices.30  
Finally, a national securities commission might fall prey to “regula-
tory capture”, that is, a situation where a regulatory agency, instead of 
acting in the public interest, acts in favour of the dominant commercial 
interests in the very industry it is called upon to regulate.31 Centralizing 
the regulation of securities markets removes an effective check on this 
risk, this check being regulatory competition.32 The risk of “regulatory 
capture” cannot be dismissed lightly given the high concentration of the 
financial industry in Canada, with the large banks controlling the major 
investment dealers firms.33 Indeed, capture of the regulatory process is 
more probable where concentration is high.34 Provincial regulatory agen-
cies are not immune to such capture, but monopolizing the attention of 
each and every one of the 13 provincial and territorial securities commis-
sions is less likely to happen.35 
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 Id., at 46. 
27
 Id., at 47-48. 
28
 The previous two sentences were penned by my colleague Stéphane Rousseau. Professor 
Rousseau is a securities law specialist. Not being able to call mine the modifications he so gener-
ously proposed after reading my manuscript, I therefore decided to insert them in my paper with a 
clear identification of their origin. 
29
 The Wise Persons, supra, note 7, at 68 and Hockin Report, supra, note 7, at 47. 
30
 Sabbah, supra, note 11, at 47-48. 
31
 Jean-Marc Suret & Cécile Carpentier, “The Canadian and American Financial Systems: 
Competition and Regulation” (2003) 29 Canadian Public Policy 431. 
32
 This sentence and the following two sentences were penned by my colleague Stéphane 
Rousseau. 
33
 For a similar preoccupation, see Jean-Marc Suret and Cécile Carpentier, supra, note 11.  
34
 Gary Becker, “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence” 
(1983) 98 Quart. J. Econ. 371. 
35
 Sabbah, supra, note 11, at 49. 
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A look at the evolution of securities legislation in Canada since the be-
ginning of the 20th century also shows the deep involvement of provinces 
in securities regulation. More particularly, such evolution demonstrates 
that provinces have experimented with different regulatory approaches.36 
In 1912, Manitoba enacted the first Blue Sky law, inspired by the regula-
tory approach put forth by Kansas in the United States.37 Pursuant to the 
Blue Sky model, in order to protect investors, the governmental authority 
had control over share issues. While a number of provinces followed 
Manitoba,38 other provinces experimented with other techniques. Ontario, 
for instance, followed another path with the Security Frauds Prevention 
Act,39 which established a registration regime backed by sanction provi-
sions for fraud. Quebec preferred to rely on a disclosure model and only 
later integrated anti-fraud provisions.40 
After the market crash of 1929, the United States undertook a fun-
damental reform of its regulatory regimes. Following an in-depth study 
of the securities market, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.41 The thrust of the reform was 
to move away from the paternalistic Blue-Sky laws to a disclosure-based 
model. The United States reforms prompted Canadian provinces to ex-
plore new avenues to regulate the securities markets. Ontario took the 
lead in following the United States model. Later, in the 1960s, with the 
publication of the Kimber Report,42 Ontario set the foundations of “mod-
ern” securities legislation with a model that was widely followed across 
provinces afterwards. 
In the 1970s, acting within the Canadian Securities Administrators, 
provincial securities commissions increasingly focused on harmoniza-
tion. The strong push toward harmonization eventually led to the 
Passport initiative. Despite the fact that securities regulation is nowadays 
                                                                                                             
36
 See generally J. Peter Williamson, Securities Legislation in Canada (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1960). 
37
 Sale of Shares Act, S.M. 1912, c. 75. See Paul G. Mahoney, “The Origins of the Blue Sky 
Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses” (2003) 46 J. Law & Econ. 229. 
38
 Christopher Armstrong, Blue Skies and Boiler Rooms: Buying and Selling Securities 
in Canada, 1870-1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), at 66-72. See also Tara 
Gray & Andrew Kitching, Reforming Canadian Securities Regulation, Parliamentary Information 
and Research Service, PRB 05-28E, 2005, at 2, online: <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ 
ResearchPublications/prb0528-e.pdf>. 
39
 S.O. 1928, c. 34. 
40
 This paragraph and the following three paragraphs were penned by Stéphane Rousseau. 
41
 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, 5th ed. (Aspen Pub-
lishers,  2004), at 1. 
42
 Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario (To-
ronto: Queen’s Printer, 1965). 
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highly harmonized at the pan-Canadian level, particularities remain in 
provincial statutes, some of which are the product of innovations stem-
ming from local initiatives. While these particularities can be seen as 
technical, they reflect the contributions that Alberta, British Columbia 
and Quebec have made over decades of regulation and that are now en-
capsulated in the harmonized framework. For instance, Quebec acted as a 
leader with respect to the regulation of various dimensions of financial 
intermediaries, such as ownership, capital structure and activities. In-
deed, Quebec was at the forefront of the decompartmentalization of 
financial institutions in the 1980s.43 This prompted the enactment of an 
original regulatory framework in Quebec concerning financial intermedi-
aries.44 
A contemporary example of the role of diversity in securities regula-
tion is found in the “Canadian response” to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.45, 46 
Adopted in 2002 in the wake of the wave of corporate scandals that hit 
the United States, SOX introduced stringent requirements to restore in-
vestor confidence. Despite its sound objective, SOX was criticized for 
imposing undue costs on issuers. In Canada, the Canadian Securities 
Administrators debated whether or not to implement SOX-like reforms 
north of the border. The debates centred on whether SOX should be “cut 
and pasted” in Canada or whether it should be adapted to the Canadian 
context. Ultimately, adaptation was favoured. The Canadian Securities 
Administrators adopted regulation that imposed additional corporate gov-
ernance requirements tailored to the particularities of Canadian issuers. 
From the foregoing, it follows that provinces are certainly not incapa-
ble of regulating securities. Nevertheless, proponents of decentralization 
do recognize a legitimate role for Parliament in the field of securities regu-
lation. Cédric Sabbah,47 for instance, argues for recognition of federal 
power only where provinces are constitutionally unable to intervene or 
where a truly national public interest is at stake. In other words, recogni-
tion of federal authority would hinge upon proof being made that federal 
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 On the transformation of financial institutions, see Christopher C. Nicholls, Financial In-
stitutions — The Regulatory Framework (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2008). 
44
 See Act respecting the distribution of financial products and services, R.S.Q., c. D-9.2 
adopted in 1998. 
45
 An Act to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclo-
sures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes [hereinafter “SOX”]. 
46
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Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, Canada Steps Up, vol. 4 — Maintaining a Competitive 
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 Sabbah, supra, note 11, at 108-16 and 153-56. 
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intervention constitutes a plus-value and not simply a means of providing 
uniformity of regulation just for the sake of uniformity.  
According to that logic, Sabbah argues for a complementary federal-
provincial regulation model. Provinces would remain competent as re-
gards the protection of investors and public protection, while Parliament 
would be endowed with the power to regulate matters having cross-
border, i.e., extraprovincial aspects. That category would comprise mat-
ters such as the regulation of stock exchanges, hub of all sorts of 
interprovincial and international transactions. Representation of Canada 
in international forums and authority to negotiate international agree-
ments would also fall in the federal lap. Finally, Sabbah argues for a 
federal power to establish minimal standards that provinces would have 
to integrate to their own sets of rules so as to prevent the dreaded “race to 
the bottom” and also, more importantly, because Ottawa is the only level 
of government that can legitimately claim a right to determine where the 
national public interest lies — the public interest being the guiding prin-
ciple of all 13 securities regulators.48  
Sabbah insists that to capitalize on the advantages of both provincial 
securities specialization and interprovincial competition, a market par-
ticipant should be allowed to choose a primary jurisdiction of his or her 
choice.49 But for this choice to be abided by, the participant’s province of 
                                                                                                             
48
 Id., at 23-28, 108 and 119. 
49
 Id., at 89-90, 96-108 and 137-39. Presently, s. 1.1 of the Provincial/Territorial Memo-
randum of Understanding Regarding Securities Regulation, online: <http://www.securitiescanada. 
org/2004_0930_mou_english.pdf> defines the “primary jurisdiction” as the province or territory to 
which a market participant is considered to be most closely connected for the purposes of the meas-
ures contemplated in the Memorandum. In most circumstances this will correspond  
i) for an individual registrant, the jurisdiction in which the individual’s normal working 
office is located;  
ii) for a registrant that is not an individual, the jurisdiction in which the registrant’s head 
office is located;  
iii) for an issuer, the jurisdiction in which the issuer’s head office is located. 
Section 5.1 of the Memorandum specifies that the  
passport system for securities regulation will provide a single window of access to market 
participants. This could be done through mutual recognition, legal delegation, or a com-
bination of these approaches, as one approach may work best in certain areas of 
regulation but be less than optimal in other areas. 
 Under mutual recognition, participating jurisdictions would recognize that a market 
participant who complies with, files documents under and/or receives approvals respect-
ing market access requirements of the primary jurisdiction, is deemed to be in compliance 
with or exempt from the market access compliance, document filing and/or approval re-
quirements of its host jurisdiction(s). 
 Under legal delegation, participating jurisdictions would delegate powers to make 
decisions to the primary jurisdiction. 
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origin would then have to ensure that the selected regulatory regime be 
applicable within the limits of its own territory. Although, in my view, 
the constitutional validity of such a “referential legislation” scheme is not 
to be doubted, I believe that resort may be had to a complementary fed-
eral legislation ensuring the extraprovincial application of provincial 
regulation. If the central government is competent over the interprovin-
cial aspects of securities and over extraterritorial issues,50 it can most 
certainly incorporate by reference legal rules it might have adopted itself. 
Finally, it is trite law that federal legislation can apply only in one or in 
some provinces.51 
Whether or not Sabbah’s proposition should be followed to the letter 
is a question that falls to be answered by securities experts. However it 
does illustrate that, if serious consideration is given to the empirical real-
ity of the securities environment in Canada, an unavoidable conclusion 
imposes itself: it is far from self-evident that federal uniformity and ex-
clusivity of regulation would necessarily lead to greater efficiency. 
Therefore, when in doubt, and especially so in a federal state, the prudent 
approach, it seems to me, would be for courts to recoil from any federal 
demand for exclusive control of the securities markets.  
Be that as it may, as I will now try to demonstrate, the dice appear 
loaded against any attempt at limiting federal jurisdiction over both the 
intra-and extraprovincial aspects of securities regulation. To recognize a 
federal power of such extent, the Supreme Court need not think out of 
the box. To paraphrase the aviator in Saint-Exupéry’s tale, “GRT is a 
crate. The power Ottawa wants is inside.” 
After briefly describing how the division of powers has been judi-
cially apprehended in recent years, particularly in commercial and 
economic matters (III), I will try to describe how difficult a task it will be 
for provinces to convince the Supreme Court of the necessity of preserv-
ing an unassailable provincial sphere of intervention over securities if, 
indeed, the latter tribunal invokes the GRT power as the basis of a valid 
federal intervention in that field (IV). 
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 Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] S.C.J. No. 125, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Hunt”] and Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, 1980 (Newfoundland), 
[1984] S.C.J. No. 16, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reference re Upper Churchill”]. 
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 Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 
157, at para. 61 (S.C.C.). 
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III. THE “GENERAL REGULATION OF TRADE POWER”: SETTING THE 
TABLE FOR FEDERAL SECURITIES LEGISLATION 
Since the 1960s, the federal government — liberal or conservative — 
has always nurtured a desire to invest the field of securities regulation. 
The Harper government, although apparently ready to disengage Ottawa 
from the Canadian social union, shows an uncanny earnestness in pro-
moting a strong economic union. Although the wish to ingratiate itself 
with Ontario voters is most certainly part of the equation, I surmise that 
the present government’s intent, as it was of those who preceded it, is to 
further enhance the power and legitimacy of the central government to 
regulate the economy in general.  
Parliament’s enumerated powers are, for the most part, “electorally 
unattractive”. Interprovincial transportation, communications and na-
tional defence might have had some appeal in 1867, but with the advent 
of the welfare state, health, social welfare and education have become 
the politicians’ preferred fields of battle. The sorrowful nature — if I may 
be allowed this expression — of the central government’s enumerated 
heads of power explains the enthusiastic recourse to the spending power 
witnessed during the 1960s through the 1980s and beyond. However, in 
view of the spending power’s dubious constitutionality in the eyes of 
many, the central government has tried, quite legitimately, to find ways 
of expanding its existing legislative powers.52 
After enjoying some success with its residuary power, both in its 
“emergency”53 and “national interest”54 dimensions, the federal govern-
ment was faced with the Supreme Court’s dwindling enthusiasm towards 
this potentially federation-destroying power.55 Nevertheless, as it was 
closing the door on the national interest doctrine, the Supreme Court was 
at the same time opening wide the window of the criminal law power. 
“The purpose of the criminal law [it was said] is to underline and protect 
our fundamental values.”56 Thus inflated, the criminal law power allowed 
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 For a thorough study of this question, see Jean Leclair, “The Supreme Court’s Under-
standing of Federalism: Efficiency at the Expense of Diversity” (2003) 28 Queen’s L.J. 411, online: 
<http://hdl.handle.net/1866/1431> [hereinafter “Leclair, ‘The Supreme Court’s Understanding’”]. 
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 Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note 4. 
54
 Crown Zellerbach, supra, note 4. 
55
 See La Forest J.’s comment in R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76,  [1997] 3 
S.C.R. 213, at para. 116 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hydro-Québec”]. See Jean Leclair, “The Elusive 
Quest for the Quintessential ‘National Interest’” (2005) 38 U.B.C. L. Rev. 355. 
56
 Hydro-Québec, id., at paras. 127 and 154. See Jean Leclair, “The Supreme Court, the En-
vironment, and the Construction of National Identity” (1998) 4 Revue d’études constitutionnelles/ 
Review of Constitutional Studies 372. 
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for interventions in the fields of health protection57 and environment pro-
tection.58  
Although open, the door was not unhinged. Indeed, the “dangerous 
character” of an activity, a person or an object, operates as an intrinsic 
limit to the criminal law power. Absent such danger, the application of 
the criminal law power cannot be triggered. Justice La Forest, in Hydro-
Québec, took time to point out that, contrary to the national interest doc-
trine, the criminal law power did not assign “full power to regulate an 
area to Parliament. … Rather it seeks by discrete prohibitions to prevent 
evils falling within a broad purpose, such as, for example, the protection 
of health.”59 Furthermore, unlike the national interest doctrine,60 the 
criminal law power does not confer on Parliament an exclusive and per-
manent jurisdiction over both the interprovincial and the intraprovincial 
aspects of a particular matter. Therefore, a widened criminal law power 
does not prevent the working of the double aspect doctrine.61 
The residuary power and the criminal law power, however broadly 
they have been interpreted, cannot be successfully mobilized to allow for 
Parliament to regulate the economy. Another field of jurisdiction must be 
sought.  
Of the many federal enumerated powers endowing Parliament with 
authority to regulate the economy,62 the most encompassing is the federal 
trade and commerce power (section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867). 
Prior to 1989, this field of jurisdiction had been interpreted as conferring 
on Parliament the exclusive power to regulate interprovincial and inter-
national commerce and to regulate intraprovincial transactions only to 
the extent that it was necessarily incidental to the effective regulation of 
interprovincial and international trade.63 Although this incidental power 
did exist, it has not been invoked frequently by the Courts to justify fed-
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 RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 
S.C.R. 199, at para. 69 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “RJR-MacDonald”]: “Health underlies many of our 
most cherished rights and values, and the protection of public health is one of the fundamental re-
sponsibilities of Parliament.” 
58
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 Id., at para. 128. 
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 For a description of the Supreme Court’s liberal interpretation of Parliament’s powers 
over the economy, see Leclair, “The Supreme Court’s Understanding”, supra, note 52, at 421-30. 
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 Caloil Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1970] S.C.J. No. 91, [1971] S.C.R. 543 
(S.C.C.) and R. v. Klassen, [1959] M.J. No. 63, 20 D.L.R. (2d) 406 (Man. C.A.). 
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eral encroachments on the provinces’ jurisdiction over intraprovincial 
commerce.64  
All this changed in 1989 with the General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. 
City National Leasing Ltd. decision.65 In that case, building upon an ear-
lier judicial gloss66 on a very laconic statement made by the Privy 
Council more than 100 years before,67 a unanimous Court recognized 
Parliament’s power over the regulation of “general trade and commerce 
affecting Canada as a whole”.68 This new power enabled Parliament, un-
der certain conditions, to adopt legislation “concerned with trade as a 
whole rather than with a particular industry”.69 What it conferred on the 
central government was jurisdiction over both the interprovincial and the 
intraprovincial aspects of trade.70 Thus, in City National Leasing, a fed-
eral law regulating competition was held to be intra vires even though it 
encroached upon the provinces’ jurisdiction over intraprovincial competi-
tion.  
However, just like the criminal law power, the GRT power does not 
impair the workings of the double aspect doctrine: GRT constitutes the 
exclusive power; the matter that falls under that head does not.71  
The five criteria devised by Dickson C.J.C. in City National Leasing 
to determine whether a matter falls under GRT were summed up as fol-
lows in Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc.:  
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 This led Dickson J., as he then was, to note that, even though there is always a “ … pos-
sibility for a [provincial] scheme to affect incidentally inter-provincial trade, so long as the scheme is 
not in pith and substance in relation to interprovincial trade. This last proposition, while obvious in 
other areas of constitutional law, was remarkably absent in the cases respecting trade and commerce 
decided in the first half of this century.”: Canadian Industrial Gas & Oil Ltd. v. Saskatchewan, 
[1977] S.C.J. No. 124, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 545, at 603 (S.C.C.) (Dickson J. was writing in dissent but 
not on this particular point). 
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 [1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “City National Leasing”]. 
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 City National Leasing, supra, note 65, at 657. 
69
 Id., at 661. 
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 Id., at 680-81. 
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 Id., at 682: “ … competition is not a single matter, any more than inflation or pollution. 
The provinces too, may deal with competition in the exercise of their legislative powers in such 
fields as consumer protection, labour relations, marketing and the like. The point is, however, that 
Parliament also has the constitutional power to regulate intraprovincial aspects of competition.” 
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(i) the impugned legislation must be part of a regulatory scheme; (ii) 
the scheme must be monitored by the continuing oversight of a 
regulatory agency; (iii) the legislation must be concerned with trade as 
a whole rather than with a particular industry; (iv) the legislation should 
be of a nature that provinces jointly or severally would be 
constitutionally incapable of enacting; and (v) the failure to include one 
or more provinces or localities in a legislative scheme would jeopardize 
the successful operation of the scheme in other parts of the country … 
These factors are not exhaustive and, to be valid, it is not necessary for 
federal legislation to satisfy all five criteria.72 
The difficulties raised by these criteria will be addressed below. For 
the time being, I wish only to underline how uncannily appropriate this 
test appears to be for recognizing a federal power over securities.  
My belief, even though I have no evidence to buttress this claim, is 
that Dickson J. (as he then was) had both competition and securities 
regulation in mind when he wrote his dissenting opinion in Canadian 
National Transportation. A year earlier, in Multiple Access Ltd. v. 
McCutcheon,73 he had taken great pains to underline, in obiter, that in 
acknowledging a provincial power over securities he was not to be un-
derstood as denying “the constitutional right of Parliament to enact a 
general scheme of securities legislation pursuant to its power to make 
laws in relation to interprovincial and export trade and commerce”.74 And 
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 [2005] S.C.J. No. 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302, 2005 SCC 65, at para. 17 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
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 Id., at 173-74: 
Parliament has not yet enacted any comprehensive scheme of securities legislation. To 
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and Exchange Commission has regulated trading and primary distribution of securities. I 
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produced Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada (1979). Professor Anisman, 
writing in 1981 in respect of those proposals expressed the view that: 
… the factors that indicated a need for federal regulatory involvement in the securities 
market in 1979 are still present and, if anything, have been reinforced by events during 
the past two years. The Proposals are premised ultimately on the national and interna-
tional character of the Canadian securities market and its importance to the economic 
welfare of the country. The fact that the market is national in scope has long been ac-
knowledged and is demonstrated by the cooperative efforts of the provincial 
commissions with respect to the adoption of national policies and by the statutory au-
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even though he acknowledged that, since the 1932 Lymburn v. Mayland75 
case, courts had systematically given wide constitutional recognition to 
provincial securities regulations, he nonetheless quoted with approval76 
the following excerpt from Philip Anisman’s and Peter W. Hogg’s 1979 
study entitled “Constitutional Aspects of Federal Securities Legislation”:  
The reluctance of the courts to strike down provincial securities 
legislation likely stems in part from the fact that there is no federal 
securities law so that a declaration of the invalidity of a provincial act 
or any of its provisions would create a potential gap in the existing 
regulatory scheme that might be exploited by the unscrupulous.77  
In City National Leasing itself, Dickson C.J.C. again referred to this 
same study, not once but twice.78 He did not then emit any opinion as to 
the constitutional validity of hypothetical federal securities legislation. 
Nevertheless, his reading of Professors Anisman’s and Hogg’s paper es-
tablishes beyond doubt that he was aware of the potentialities of section 
91(2) as a basis for federal intervention in the field of securities.  
Finally, in the recent Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia 
(Securities Commission),79 while giving an expansive interpretation to 
the province’s power over the securities market, the Supreme Court again 
went out of its way to stress that, though it “decline[d] to comment on 
the constitutionality of hypothetical overlapping federal legislation”, it 
                                                                                                             
thorization for and increasing frequency of joint hearings held by a number of provin-
cial commissions to decide issues that transcend provincial boundaries.  
Justice Estey, dissenting on another issue, shared a similar point of view (at 225):  
Counsel for the Attorney General for Canada did not wish to found the validity of these 
sections upon an independent claim that, by reason of the potential extra-provincial na-
ture of securities trading, they could be sustained by the authority of s. 91(2) alone. I 
venture to say that there will be more and more challenges in the future to the dominant 
position now occupied by the securities exchange authorities of the province in which the 
major stock exchange of the country is located. As the magnitude and number of multi-
provincial security transactions increase the strain on the present unbalanced regulatory 
system will mount. It remains to be seen whether this will precipitate a change in the na-
tional appreciation of constitutional requirements and federal legislative policy. Until 
such a development occurs the disposition of this appeal must be found in the light of the 
positions herein taken by the parties. These reasons therefore reflect only the record as 
advanced by the proponents and opponents of the traditional arguments on the constitu-
tional nature of corporate and securities legislation. 
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had, in Multiple Access Ltd., “already upheld aspects of federal securities 
regulation … under the ‘double aspect’ theory”.80  
Therefore, at first glance, it seems most probable that, enticed by Pe-
ter W. Hogg’s eloquence and charming accent, the Supreme Court will 
do what it does best, i.e., quote and concur with Peter W. Hogg. And if a 
federal jurisdiction over securities is found to exist on the basis of the 
GRT power, then nothing will be able to stop Parliament from regulating 
both the intra- and extraprovincial aspects of this subject matter. How-
ever, before moving on to the examination of that particular facet of the 
issue, the following caveat must be made.  
As I said in the introduction, this article is based on the presumption 
that the Supreme Court of Canada will resort to the GRT power as a 
means of providing the central government with authority to regulate the 
securities market. My intent therefore is to examine whether or not there 
exists, under the present state of Canadian constitutional law, a means by 
which the federal government could be prevented from entirely ousting 
the provinces from this field. However, before pursuing this tack, it must 
be confessed that my presumption might not materialize, i.e., the Su-
preme Court might not recognize the GRT power as a valid ground for a 
proposed federal Securities Act.  
Such a conclusion could flow from the inability of the recently pro-
posed federal legislation to satisfy the fifth criterion enunciated in City 
National Leasing: “the failure to include one or more provinces or locali-
ties in a legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful operation of 
the scheme in other parts of the country”.81 Now, as it presently stands, 
the Proposed Canadian Securities Act82 released on May 26, 2010 indi-
cates, in its preamble, that “Parliament intends to create a single 
Canadian securities regulator” and, more importantly for our purpose, it 
states that Parliament “chooses to do so through a process under which 
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 Id., at para. 46:  
The Attorney General of Canada intervened in this appeal to argue that: “if the provision 
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 Supra, note 5. 
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the regime will apply as willing provinces and territories opt in”. Sec-
tions 250 (1) and (2) prescribe as follows:  
 250 (1) Subject to sections 251 and 252, sections 1 to 10 and Parts 
1 to 14 do not apply in a province unless it is designated under sub-
section (2). 
 (2) After receiving the written consent of the Lieutenant Governor 
in Council of a province and on the recommendation of the Minister, 
the Governor in Council may, by order, designate the province as a 
participating province.  
In other words, unless the written consent of a province’s political 
authorities is given, the bulk of the proposed federal legislation will not 
apply in that province. As a consequence, according to the federal gov-
ernment itself, the effectiveness of its legislative scheme does not require 
the participation of all provinces. If that is so, how then can it be argued 
that “the failure to include one or more provinces or localities in [the] 
legislative scheme [will] jeopardize the successful operation of the 
scheme in other parts of the country”? Ironically, in trying not to alienate 
the provinces by providing for an opting-in procedure instead of impos-
ing a full-blown uniform regulatory system, the federal authorities may 
have committed constitutional harakiri.  
It remains to be seen, however, whether the Supreme Court will 
downplay this fifth criterion by calling to mind its cautionary remark 
enunciated in City National Leasing, according to which “[t]hese indicia 
do not, however, represent an exhaustive list of traits that will tend to 
characterize general trade and commerce legislation. Nor is the presence 
or absence of any of these five criteria necessarily determinative.”83 
Closing this parenthesis, let us presume then that the Supreme Court 
of Canada will indeed resort to the GRT power as a means of providing 
the central government with authority to regulate the securities market, 
and let us examine whether or not there exists, under the present state of 
Canadian constitutional law, a means by which the federal government 
could be prevented from entirely ousting the provinces from this field. 
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IV. THE OBSTACLES TO THE PRESERVATION OF AN  
UNASSAILABLE PROVINCIAL SPHERE OF INTERVENTION  
OVER SECURITIES  
If an efficient securities market requires the presence of both levels 
of government, how can one make sure that the federal government will 
not entirely expel the provinces from this field? What kind of constitu-
tional barriers could be erected around Parliament’s GRT power? Not 
many, I fear.  
Before examining some possible avenues, let us look at how the pre-
sent structure of the Supreme Court’s understanding of the constitutional 
division of powers makes it difficult to envisage a complementary fed-
eral-provincial approach to the regulation of securities. 
First of all, to limit the extent of Parliament’s power over GRT, one 
must attack the very definition given to the power84 because, once a 
power is recognized as allowing Parliament to intervene at both the intra- 
and extraprovincial levels, courts are prohibited from scrutinizing the 
manner in which that power is exercised. In a sense, the division of pow-
ers is an “all of nothing” game. A level of government either has a power 
to regulate (directly through one of its exclusive heads of jurisdiction or 
indirectly by way of its ancillary power) or it does not. Once recognized, 
the exercise of such a power cannot be modulated according to the 
wishes of the courts.  
If, for instance, the Supreme Court recognizes the existence of a na-
tional emergency, it will serve no purpose to argue that the proposed 
federal remedy will be inefficient.85 If, for example, Parliament is said to 
be authorized to regulate the sale of young hooded seals under its fisher-
ies jurisdiction,86 or the licensing and registration of ordinary firearms 
under its criminal law power,87 the Court will refuse to hear arguments 
based on extrinsic evidence to the effect that the federal legislation 
should have been better designed,88 that the federal government should 
have engaged in more consultation with the provinces prior to its  
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enactment,89 that the law will not be effective,90 that it is inappropriate or 
undesirable from a social or economic perspective,91 that its implementa-
tion will be too expensive,92 or that the government failed to employ the 
best means to achieve its purpose.93  
There is, however, one exception to the rule that extrinsic evidence 
cannot be invoked to sustain the validity of legislation. In City National 
Leasing, the Supreme Court revisited the ancillary power doctrine, that 
is, the power recognized to both levels of government to legislate in 
ways that may incidentally affect the other government’s spheres of 
power. Chief Justice Dickson stated that, in determining whether or not 
an impugned provision is valid, one must focus on its connection to or 
relationship with valid legislation.94 This connection is assessed by estab-
lishing “how well the provision is integrated into the scheme of the 
legislation and how important it is for the efficacy of the legislation”.95 
Measuring such efficacy should therefore justify resorting to empirical 
evidence. I say “should” because, in that case, Dickson C.J.C. confirmed 
the validity of the impugned provision without going outside of the legis-
lation itself. He found the private right of action to be “a core provision” 
of the Combines Investigation Act because it served to reinforce other 
sanctions of the Act; it was intimately linked to the Act and could only be 
understood by reference to other provisions of the Act and had no inde-
pendent content. Finally, the impugned provision provided a private 
remedy only for particular violations of the Act and did not create a pri-
vate right of action at large.96 
The Court has also rejected arguments claiming that a federal legisla-
tion trenched on provincial powers in a manner that risked upsetting the 
balance of federalism. Indeed, as the Court was quick to answer, once 
found to be valid, a law cannot be said to upset the balance of federal-
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ism.97 The Court also concluded that a proportionality test similar to the 
one developed under section 1 of the Canadian Charter should not be 
resorted to when courts are called upon to delimit the scope of the pow-
ers set out in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.98  
Virginity does not allow half-measures, likewise for constitutional 
authority. Either a level of government is competent or it is not. 
If a jurisdiction over securities is ever recognized to Parliament un-
der the GRT power, one will be hard pressed to convince a court that the 
reach of the legislation is too great or that provinces should have been 
consulted, or that such recognition of power upsets the balance of feder-
alism.  
The second hurdle faced by those who would wish to see Parlia-
ment’s power over GRT curbed is that the Supreme Court, in recent 
years, has become a staunch advocate of concurrent powers. Indeed, the 
aspect doctrine and its corollary, the double aspect, now so dominate 
constitutional thinking that we are witnessing a “ratatinement jurispru-
dentiel du principe d’exclusivité”,99 a judicial shrivelling of the 
exclusivity principle.100  
The Court quite systematically upholds provincial or federal legisla-
tion, resorting to the paramountcy principle to settle the issue of conflict 
between federal and provincial legislation.101 Therefore, if the constitu-
tional validity of federal securities legislation is ever challenged before 
the Supreme Court, it stands a good chance of being upheld. The Court 
will probably recoil at the idea of substituting a more conceptual defini-
tion of GRT, which would call for an explicit definition of its exclusive 
core, to its present highly pragmatic and functional approach.  
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Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court justifies its refusal to define 
the core of a legislative head of power by the danger it would entail for 
provincial powers: 
Excessive reliance on the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity 
would create serious uncertainty. It is based on the attribution to every 
legislative head of power of a “core” of indeterminate scope — difficult 
to define, except over time by means of judicial interpretations 
triggered serendipitously on a case-by-case basis. The requirement to 
develop an abstract definition of a “core” is not compatible, generally 
speaking, with the tradition of Canadian constitutional interpretation, 
which favours an incremental approach. While it is true that the 
enumerations of ss. 91 and 92 contain a number of powers that are 
precise and not really open to discussion, other powers are far less 
precise, such as those relating to the criminal law, trade and commerce 
and matters of a local or private nature in a province. Since the time of 
Confederation, courts have refrained from trying to define the possible 
scope of such powers in advance and for all time ...102  
Justice Binnie goes on to explain that defining the core of a particu-
lar field of jurisdiction is particularly dangerous where the commerce 
power is concerned: 
For example, while the courts have not eviscerated the federal trade and 
commerce power, they have, in interpreting it, sought to avoid draining 
of their content the provincial powers over civil law and matters of a 
local or private nature. A generalized application of interjurisdictional 
immunity related to “trade and commerce” would have led to an 
altogether different and more rigid and centralized form of federalism. 
It was by proceeding with caution on a case-by-case basis that the 
courts were gradually able to define the content of the heads of power 
of Parliament and the legislatures, without denying the unavoidable 
interplay between them, always having regard to the evolution of the 
problems for which the division of legislative powers must now 
provide solutions.103 
So then, trying to limit the extent of a federal power over GRT by 
trying to define its exclusive core would not be an easy task to undertake. 
In fact, such a strategy might backfire in the provinces’ faces. The central 
government could end up with even more power than that with which it 
is presently endowed. 
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Third, the Court’s penchant for concurrency and “co-operative feder-
alism”,104 its reticence towards the imposition of abstract limitations, its 
emphasis “on the legitimate interplay between federal and provincial 
powers”,105 its “concern that a court should favour, where possible, the 
ordinary operation of statutes enacted by both levels of government”,106 
all this translates into a willingness, where need be, to resort to the ancil-
lary power doctrine to justify the validity of a federal107 or provincial 
law.108  
In fact, City National Leasing is a good example of a situation where 
the Supreme Court offered one level of government the best of all 
worlds: the disputed legislation was held to be intra vires on the basis of 
the aspect doctrine, whereas the impugned provision was justified by re-
course to the ancillary power. As we saw, Dickson C.J.C. held that it was 
“sufficiently integrated into the Act to sustain its constitutionality”.109 
The Kirkbi case followed the same approach, with the same result.110 
Again, any strategy aimed at limiting the scope of Parliament’s power 
would appear doomed to failure.  
It bears underlining that the Court’s understanding of cooperative 
federalism is radically different from that of the Privy Council. The 
Court’s understanding is based on the conviction that “… the task of 
maintaining the balance of powers in practice falls primarily to govern-
ments” and that, accordingly, “constitutional doctrine must facilitate, not 
undermine what this Court has called ‘co-operative federalism’”.111 In 
contrast, the Privy Council’s brand of cooperative federalism envisaged a 
much greater role for courts. By strictly confining both levels of govern-
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ment to the exercise of their exclusive powers, the Privy Council was in 
fact imposing on the federal government an obligation to cooperate with 
provinces.112 The modern brand of cooperative federalism affords a much 
greater leeway to the central government. If it chooses to resort to its 
paramount power, it could by-pass the provinces altogether. As Bruce 
Ryder puts it, the Court’s approach puts the provinces  
in the position of supplicants to the federal government. To secure 
legislative space for the pursuit of distinct policy objectives, the 
provinces must negotiate with a national government that is holding the 
legal trump card — the federal paramountcy rule — in its hand ... So 
long as the provincial pursuit of distinct policies in the growing areas of 
shared jurisdiction is conditional upon federal consent or forbearance, 
the provinces cannot be confident that their autonomy will be secured 
in the future.113 
In Reference re Anti-Inflation Act,114 counsel for one of the interven-
ers submitted that, instead of turning immediately to its emergency 
power to regulate inflation, Parliament should have sought a federal-
provincial cooperative scheme circumscribed by each level of govern-
ment’s respective powers under sections 91 and 92. Chief Justice Laskin 
bluntly rejected this suggestion in the following terms:  
No doubt, federal-provincial co-operation along the lines suggested 
might have been attempted, but it does not follow that the federal 
policy that was adopted is vulnerable because a co-operative scheme on 
a legislative power basis was not tried first. Co-operative federalism 
may be consequential upon a lack of federal legislative power, but it is 
not a ground for denying it.115 
I believe that the modern understanding of cooperative federalism is 
more in tune with that of Laskin C.J.C. than that of the Privy Council. 
This in no way facilitates attempts at limiting the reach of a federal 
power. 
Is there no way then to curtail the authority over securities which the 
GRT power would confer on the central government?  
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V. DELIMITING THE REACH OF THE GENERAL REGULATION OF 
TRADE POWER: RESORTING TO THE PARTICULAR NATURE  
OF THIS FIELD OF JURISDICTION AS A NORMATIVE AND  
METHODOLOGICAL YARDSTICK 
Guaranteeing jurisdictional space for provinces over securities re-
quires, as I have said before, a re-examination of the GRT power itself. 
Two avenues are open that both emphasize the need to appeal to the par-
ticular nature of a field of jurisdiction as a measuring yardstick of its 
potential reach: a normative approach and a methodological approach. 
Both will now be analyzed. 
1. The Normative Approach: Commerce as Competition 
Out of the few elements that enable courts to assess the potential 
range of a field of jurisdiction, the distinct nature of the latter is quite 
certainly the most important. In other words, the singular essence of a 
power will not only determine its compass but also the type of legislative 
objectives that a level of government is allowed to pursue.116 
In Hydro-Québec,117 La Forest J. stated that in determining the extent 
of Parliament’s power over the environment, the nature of each and every 
one of its powers had to be taken into account:  
In examining the validity of legislation … , it must be underlined that 
the nature of the relevant legislative powers must be examined. 
Different types of legislative powers may support different types of 
environmental provisions. The manner in which such provisions must 
be related to a legislative scheme was, by way of example, discussed in 
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Oldman River in respect of railways, navigable waters and fisheries. An 
environmental provision may be validly aimed at curbing 
environmental damage, but in some cases the environmental damage 
may be directly related to the power itself. There is a considerable 
difference between regulating works and activities, like railways, and a 
resource like fisheries, and consequently the environmental provisions 
relating to each of these. Environmental provisions must be tied to the 
appropriate constitutional source.118  
The intrinsic limit of certain powers enables courts to define, with a 
certain degree of precision, the bounds of their reach or the type of inter-
ventions they authorize. For instance, the criminal law power requires 
that there be an element of danger in the activity, the person or the thing 
regulated. Absent such danger, section 91(27) cannot be invoked.119 
Likewise, Ottawa’s power over fisheries does not allow it to control local 
logging operations on the sole basis that they might have deleterious ef-
fects on fish.120 To be valid, a federal provision based on such 
jurisdiction must link the proscribed conduct to actual or potential harm 
to fisheries. A blanket prohibition of certain types of activity falling un-
der provincial power is not sufficiently linked to any likely harm to 
fisheries. 
Therefore, in the execution of their mandate as arbiters of federalism, 
courts are allowed to invoke the particular nature of a field of jurisdiction 
to limit its reach. What of the GRT power? Could the singular nature of 
that field of jurisdiction enable courts to limit its ambit? 
At first glance, one would think that there are no internal limits im-
posed by the nature of such a power. GRT grants the right to regulate 
both the intra- and the extraprovincial dimensions of a “trade” matter, as 
long as the latter is aimed at the economy as a single integrated national 
unit rather than as a collection of separate local enterprises. Provided that 
the matter regulated possesses the required quiddity, all methods seem 
therefore legitimate, whether they impinge on provincial powers or not. 
However, a closer look at the reasoning of Dickson C.J.C. in City Na-
tional Leasing might cast some light on the issue.  
In that case, Dickson C.J.C. clearly emphasized the fundamental im-
portance of efficiency in determining whether power should or should not 
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be recognized to Parliament under the GRT rubric. As we saw earlier, 
one of the constitutional triggers of that power is empirical evidence that 
“the failure to include one or more provinces or localities in a [federal] 
legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful operation of the 
scheme in other parts of the country”.121 In other words, one must dem-
onstrate that the failure to include one or more provinces would lead to 
inefficiency. After reviewing arguments on that subject in Section VIII of 
the decision,122 Dickson C.J.C. came to the conclusion that “[these argu-
ments] ma[d]e it clear that not only is the Act meant to cover 
intraprovincial trade, but that it must do so if it is to be effective”.123 Ear-
lier on, he had peremptorily asserted: “It is evident from this discussion 
that competition cannot be effectively regulated unless it is regulated na-
tionally.”124 
If efficiency is of such moment for determining the existence of a 
federal power under GRT, could it not be argued that the very nature of 
that power demands that efficiency be taken seriously? In other words, 
since all fields of jurisdiction comprehend both a descriptive and a nor-
mative dimension, should not the courts be forced to require credible 
evidence, based on empirically valid conclusions, as to the exact nature 
of the strengths and the weaknesses of the Canadian securities market? 
From a more normative perspective, could it not be contended that com-
merce is more in tune with competition than with monopoly, with 
diversity and experimentation than with uniformity? 
A normative perspective sympathetic to competition is also infinitely 
more compatible with a federal structure of government. The Supreme 
Court is oftentimes lyrically eloquent when economic imperatives are 
said to justify by-passing territorial barriers.125 In Hunt, for instance, La 
Forest J. noted that, Canada being a federation, the traditional rules of 
private international law emphasizing sovereignty needed to be softened. 
Ironically, he claimed that these rules seemed “to ‘fly in the face of the 
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obvious intention of the Constitution to create a single country’”.126 
Though I agree with La Forest J., conversely, it could also be contended 
that, Canada being a federation, care must be taken not to bestow the en-
tirety of economic control in the hands of one level of government. A 
true federal spirit requires an assessment of both the virtue of unity and 
that of diversity. 
This keenness for uniformity also translates into a presumption that 
federalism necessarily entails the pursuit of harmony. In Canadian West-
ern Bank, Binnie J. mentioned “foster[ing] co-operation among 
governments and legislatures for the common good” as one of the fun-
damental objectives of federalism.127 But how about legitimate and 
fruitful interprovincial competition? If, as the same Binnie J. tells us, 
constitutional doctrines “must also be designed to reconcile the legiti-
mate diversity of regional experimentation with the need for national 
unity”,128 then commerce, it would seem, is the ideal sphere where such 
experimentation should be encouraged.  
Although it sometimes appears as if interprovincial competition is an 
expression to be avoided129 — this might have to do with the fact that 
provincial disharmony is a trigger for the setting in motion of the GRT 
power — our constitutional structure is designed to stimulate and pro-
mote it. In Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson,130 Iaccobucci 
and Bastarache JJ., for the majority, said the following:  
The federal structure of our Constitution authorizes the growth of 
distinct systems of commercial regulation whose application is 
inevitably defined “in terms of provincial boundaries”. Provincial 
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legislation validly enacted under s. 92 of the Constitution is applicable 
only within a single province and may have an effect on the conditions 
according to which a livelihood may be pursued. Federal legislation, or 
cooperative federal-provincial legislative schemes, may also apply only 
in some provinces and, thus, create variable conditions for the pursuit 
of a livelihood in different provinces ... This type of economic 
legislation, and the growth of divergent regulatory regimes in the 
provinces, is undoubtedly authorized by the Constitution.131 
Canada not being a unitary state, judges as arbiters of federalism 
must therefore reflect upon the economic and commercial benefits that 
can flow from decentralization. Some of these benefits have been de-
scribed in Part II and, therefore, need not be reiterated.132  
Another argument in favour of a complementary federal-provincial 
approach in economic and commercial matters is that, when confronted 
with a potentially all-encompassing subject matter, the Supreme Court has 
generally refused to confine its regulation to one level of government. 
Hence, what was deemed appropriate for inflation and environment should 
also be applied to economic and commercial regulation.  
Indeed, a tried and true solution exists when Canadian legislatures 
seek to endow a single regulator with jurisdiction to address both the  
intra- and extraprovincial dimensions of trade.133 Divided jurisdiction 
over trade, a fundamental feature of Canadian federalism since Par-
sons,
134
 can be overcome through a cooperative scheme of interlocking 
federal and provincial legislation, using techniques such as administra-
tive delegation and incorporation by reference. This is precisely the 
approach that the courts have encouraged and sanctioned in contexts 
such as the regulation of trucking and agricultural products marketing.135 
For example, in Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. 
Pelland, the Court upheld legislation that conferred jurisdiction over the 
intra- and extraprovincial marketing of chickens on a Quebec board.  
Justice Abella, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that “[e]ach level of 
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government enacted laws and regulations, based on their respective legis-
lative competencies, to create a unified and coherent regulatory 
scheme.”136 In response to objections to the scheme, she held that its con-
stitutional validity is supported by “a venerable chain of judicial 
precedent”.137 The federal government’s draft Securities Act, in contrast, 
chooses to assert federal jurisdiction over both the intra- and extra-
provincial aspects of securities regulation, with no legislative support 
from the provinces. Rather than push the limits of the GRT power and 
strain the federal principle, if the federal government truly wants to pur-
sue a constitutionally sound, cooperative approach to endowing a single 
regulator with jurisdiction over all aspects of securities regulation, it 
should follow the “well-established body of precedent upholding the va-
lidity of administrative delegation in aid of cooperative federalism”.138 
Finally, in interpreting the meaning to be given to a particular field of 
power, courts should be “guided by the way in which courts have inter-
preted the power in the past”139 and attention should be given to the 
manner in which past judges have apprehended “the activity at stake”.140  
Now, provinces have been validly regulating securities for next to 
100 years141 with the courts’ repeated approval.142 Provincial power has 
been said to encompass both a territorial and a personal dimension.143 
Besides, as we have seen in Part II, provinces have managed to put in 
place a system that, although not perfect, is quite efficient. All this should 
hinder attempts at interpreting the GRT power in such a way as to de-
prive provinces of a meaningful authority over securities.  
Divesting provinces of that power would also go against the grain of 
the democratic principle. Indeed, the Court seems intent on ensuring, 
through constitutional doctrines such as the double aspect doctrine, “that 
the policies of the elected legislators of both levels of government are 
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respected”.144 Discarding 100 years of provincial efforts at regulating 
securities would fly in the face of the obvious intention of the Constitu-
tion to create a federal country. 
Moreover, in examining the breadth to be given to a federal power 
over securities regulation, arguments of efficiency should not conceal the 
importance, for provinces, of the indirect revenues generated — through 
taxation for example — by the securities industry, i.e., revenues flowing 
from the establishment of financial services providers, legal and invest-
ment firms, etc.145 
If stock is taken of all that has been said already, it becomes possible 
to argue for a federal power strictly confined to matters over which the 
provinces are constitutionally incompetent. An argument of that very na-
ture was successfully adduced in Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour 
Relations Board).146  
In that case, the Supreme Court had to decide whether federal labour 
relations legislation applied to employees working at provincial nuclear 
electrical generating stations. The latter had been declared to be to the 
general advantage of Canada under subsection 92(10)(c) and section 
91(29) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In addition, atomic energy has been 
recognized as falling under Parliament’s power under section 91 of that 
Act to make laws for the peace, order and good government (“POGG”) 
of Canada. The question therefore hinged upon whether Parliament’s ex-
clusive jurisdiction over Ontario Hydro’s nuclear electrical generating 
plants under the POGG power or the declaratory power extended to la-
bour relations. In other words, was the central government invested with 
a plenary power over atomic energy? Justice Iacobucci, speaking for a 
majority of the Court on that particular issue,147 answered this question in 
the negative:  
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To summarize, the federal declaratory power is unique in that under it, 
Parliament may decide as a matter of policy to withdraw a work or an 
undertaking linked to works from what would normally be provincial 
jurisdiction by declaring the work or undertaking to be a work for the 
general advantage of Canada, or of two or more provinces. 
Parliament’s jurisdiction over a declared work is not plenary, but 
extends only to those aspects of the work which make the work 
specifically of federal jurisdiction. Put another way, Parliament obtains 
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate those aspects of the work that are 
integral to the federal interest in the work.148  
Justice Iacobucci was of the opinion that labour relations did not 
constitute one such aspect. 
Justice La Forest, dissenting on this issue, stated that there was no 
authority supporting the view that either the POGG power or the de-
claratory power should be narrowly construed because of the danger a 
liberal interpretation of these fields of jurisdiction might pose to the 
structure of Canadian federalism.149 Once a declaration is made, or 
once a matter is said to fall under the POGG power, “the legislative 
power flowing therefrom is governed by the Constitution”.150 Accord-
ing to La Forest J., “protection against abuse of these draconian powers 
is left to the inchoate but very real and effective political forces that 
undergird federalism”.151 
Inasmuch as La Forest J.’s opinion was not approved by a majority 
of the Court, an argument can be forged upon the reasoning of Iacobucci 
J. Hence, since GRT allows for recognition to Parliament of a power over 
both the intra- and the extraprovincial facets of securities regulation, 
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thereby encroaching deeply on a matter that would normally fall under 
provincial jurisdiction, one might contend that Parliament should be au-
thorized to regulate the intraprovincial aspects of securities if, and only 
if, credible evidence is put forward demonstrating that such regulation 
would lead to more efficiency. 
The exclusive power recognized to Parliament over “maritime law” 
provides an interesting counter-example. In that case, the nature of the 
power, more so than would be the case for securities regulation, called 
for an integrated and unified regulatory regime:  
Quite apart from judicial authority, the very nature of the activities of 
navigation and shipping, at least as they are practised in this country, 
makes a uniform maritime law which encompasses navigable inland 
waterways a practical necessity. Much of the navigational and shipping 
activity that takes place on Canada’s inland waterways is closely 
connected with that which takes place within the traditional geographic 
sphere of maritime law. … For it would be quite incredible, especially 
when one considers that much of maritime law is the product of 
international conventions, if the legal rights and obligations of those 
engaged in navigation and shipping arbitrarily changed as their vessels 
crossed the point at which the water ceased or, as the case may be, 
commenced to ebb and flow. Such a geographic divide is, from a 
division of powers perspective, completely meaningless, for it does not 
indicate any fundamental change in the use to which a waterway is put. 
In this country, inland navigable waterways and the seas that were 
traditionally recognized as the province of maritime law are part of the 
same navigational network, one which should, in my view, be subject 
to a uniform legal regime.  
I think it obvious that this need for legal uniformity is particularly 
pressing in the area of tortious liability for collisions and other 
accidents that occur in the course of navigation.152  
The same reasoning does not apply in matters of securities. As I have 
mentioned earlier,153 Canada’s securities market is very diversified, some 
provincial regulators specializing in particular sectors. This diversity en-
courages specialization and innovation. Therefore, it would not be 
accurate to state that, in the case of securities, “a geographic divide is, 
from a division of powers perspective, completely meaningless”. 
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Finally, the failure of Parliament as an interregional bargaining fo-
rum,154 as an institution that can counterbalance the centrifugal effects of 
Supreme Court decisions enhancing Ottawa’s power,155 brings some ad-
ditional legitimacy to such a prudent approach. 
From the preceding discussion, it could therefore be argued that, if 
the nature of the GRT jurisdiction is duly considered, the power it con-
fers over securities should be strictly confined to matters over which 
provinces are constitutionally incompetent. Competition being the es-
sence of trade, any attempt by Parliament to impose a set of uniform 
rules in sectors that traditionally have fallen under provincial jurisdiction 
should be prohibited. Furthermore, the process required to attain har-
monization in a jurisdictionally divided system of securities regulation 
stands a better chance of insuring the growth of a federal ethic than the 
unilateral imposition of national rules. Indeed, uniform standards can 
only be adopted by provinces willing to mitigate their autonomy claims 
so as to insure the benefit of all.  
To be quite honest though, there is little chance that such a radical 
approach will meet with the approval of the Court. Indeed, the whole 
purpose of “inventing” the GRT power was precisely to bestow on Par-
liament an authority it did not possess before, i.e., the right to prescribe 
uniform rules in a sector — intraprovincial trade and commerce — that 
traditionally has fallen under provincial jurisdiction. 
If so, then, at the very least, a specific methodological approach 
should guide the courts called upon to determine whether the GRT power 
should be triggered. This will be the object of the final section of this 
article. 
2. The Methodological Approach: Measuring Efficiency 
The approach developed by Dickson C.J.C. in City National Leasing 
to identify matters that could potentially fall within GRT is equivalent, in 
the words of Noura Karazivan and Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, 
to a “non-evidence based approach”.156 Indeed, as we shall see, the test is 
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no test at all. It is a purely rhetorical device. As a result, a much more 
stringent methodological approach is needed, one that will safeguard the 
diversity required at once by economic efficiency and by the principle of 
federalism. According to such an approach Parliament would only be 
authorized to regulate the intraprovincial aspects of securities if, and only 
if, it succeeds in bringing forward credible empirical evidence demon-
strating that its intervention would lead to greater efficiency.  
(a) The Problematic Nature of the “Provincial Incapacity” Test  
For clarity’s sake, let us recall the last three identification criteria for-
mulated by Dickson C.J.C.: 
… (iii) the legislation must be concerned with trade as a whole rather 
than with a particular industry; (iv) the legislation should be of a nature 
that provinces jointly or severally would be constitutionally incapable 
of enacting; and (v) the failure to include one or more provinces or 
localities in a legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful 
operation of the scheme in other parts of the country … These factors 
are not exhaustive and, to be valid, it is not necessary for federal 
legislation to satisfy all five criteria.157 
In a word, federal jurisdiction will be said to exist if provinces are 
incapable of regulating efficiently a particular field of the economy.158  
The “provincial incapacity” criterion has enjoyed some success over 
the last decades. Its use has not been confined to the GRT power. It has 
also been harnessed in the POGG case law to determine whether a matter 
has attained the required degree of singleness that clearly distinguishes it 
from matters of provincial concern and justifies considering it a single 
indivisible matter of national interest.159 
The “provincial incapacity” criterion is extremely problematic. First, 
it was mobilized and applied by the Supreme Court itself in a very erratic 
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manner160 that shows how devoid of any logical barriers a functional test 
can be.  
Second, what does “provincial incapacity” mean? Does it refer to ju-
risdictional or political inability? Could not 100 years of successful 
securities regulation count as evidence of “provincial capacity”?  
Could it mean unwillingness to cooperate then? It does seem that 
evidence of unwillingness to cooperate might be judicially equated with 
provincial incapacity. In Multiple Access Ltd., Dickson J. (as he then 
was) quoted with approval the following excerpt taken from an article 
written by Philip Anisman:161  
[T]he factors that indicated a need for federal regulatory involvement in 
the securities market in 1979 are still present and, if anything, have 
been reinforced by events during the past two years. … The fact that 
the market is national in scope has long been acknowledged and is 
demonstrated by the cooperative efforts of the provincial commissions 
with respect to the adoption of national policies and by the statutory 
authorization for and increasing frequency of joint hearings held by a 
number of provincial commissions to decide issues that transcend 
provincial boundaries.162 
It is somewhat baffling to realize that the provinces’ willingness to 
cooperate with one another to harmonize regulation over a matter that 
falls under their jurisdiction could count as a reason for vesting legisla-
tive power over that very same subject matter with the federal 
government. Furthermore, since when is provincial willingness or un-
willingness to cooperate on matters allocated under section 92 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 a reason to upset the balance of power in the Ca-
nadian federation?163 Is not a federation based on a principle of 
autonomy and diversity? 
This leads us to the third difficulty raised by the provincial incapac-
ity test. As Karazivan and Gaudreault-DesBiens underscore, Dickson 
C.J.C.’s approach is founded on the two following premises: effective-
ness can only be achieved by the federal polity and efficiency is 
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reducible to uniformity.164 However, as I have tried to demonstrate in 
Part II, these are normative statements that do not appear to be validated 
by empirical reality.  
The empirical laxity of Dickson C.J.C.’s trigger test constitutes the 
last, but not the least, important flaw that needs to be addressed. 
(b) Efficiency and Empirical Evidence  
Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the purport of “provin-
cial incapacity”, it is safe to conjecture that, in the final analysis, this 
criterion will be understood as conferring jurisdiction to Parliament over 
certain specific trade matters if provinces are incapable of regulating 
them efficiently. 
The nature of the GRT power, its very definition, imposes the re-
course, not to a conceptual, but to a highly functional approach.165 And 
although, as we saw earlier, empirical evidence of efficiency or ineffi-
ciency is generally forbidden when the constitutional validity of 
legislation is at stake, such a prohibition does not operate where the exis-
tence of a constitutional power commands that facts be demonstrated. 
In general, one needs only show that there is “a rational basis for the 
legislation” in the head of power invoked in support of its validity.166 For 
instance, in Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, Laskin C.J.C. underlined 
that, in considering the extrinsic evidence put forward to establish the 
existence of an emergency, “the Court does not look at [such evidence] in 
terms of whether it provides proof of the exceptional circumstances as a 
matter of fact. The matter concerns social and economic policy and 
hence governmental and legislative judgment.”167 Consequently, in that 
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case, even though the extrinsic evidence tended to demonstrate that the 
impugned legislation would fail at curbing inflation, a majority of judges 
nevertheless concluded that there was a rational basis for the Act as a 
crisis measure. The Anti-Inflation case demonstrates, yet again, that once 
a power is recognized to a level of government, courts are prohibited 
from scrutinizing the manner in which that power is exercised. 
The nature of the emergency power might explain the low threshold 
of evidence prescribed by the Court in Reference re Anti-Inflation Act. 
The decision to declare a state of national emergency is contingent upon 
a careful appraisal of many political, economic and social variables that 
do not necessarily all point in the same direction. The final choice is 
therefore highly political and should not fall to be made by unaccount-
able magistrates.  
Other heads of power might, however, justify the imposition of a 
more substantial burden of proof. In Kitkatla Band, the Supreme Court 
had to determine whether or not a provincial law of general application 
could be said to so affect the essential and distinctive values of Indian-
ness that it would engage the federal power over Indians and lands 
reserved for the Indians (section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867). 
After pointing out that constitutional questions should not be discussed in 
a factual vacuum, LeBel J. stated that “[e]ven in a division of powers 
case, rights must be asserted and their factual underpinnings demon-
strated.”168 In this case, the appellants were claiming that the impugned 
legislation touched upon the core of their cultural values and identity — 
their Indianness — and, as a consequence, on a federal head of power. 
More specifically, the legislation allowed for the destruction of culturally 
modified trees the band claimed as theirs. “Because of this assertion,” 
LeBel J. said, “the nature and quality of the evidence offered will have to 
be assessed and discussed.”169 He then referred to the evidentiary stan-
dards applicable in Aboriginal law cases and asserted that they were 
applicable, even if the case at hand was a division of powers case.170 Af-
ter confirming that oral evidence of Aboriginal values, customs and 
practices was necessary and relevant, he made the following comments:  
Nevertheless, this kind of evidence must be evaluated like any other. 
Claims must be established on a balance of probabilities, by persuasive 
evidence … 
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The appellants attempted to downplay the importance and relevance of 
this issue by stressing that this Court was not faced with a claim of 
aboriginal rights or title. As stated above, facts must be established in 
order to demonstrate in this case that there exists a conflict between 
federal and provincial legislative powers.171  
In this respect, he concluded that the factual basis of the claim 
looked weak and he eventually denied the existence of any conflict. 
As we saw earlier, GRT aims at conferring jurisdiction to Parliament 
over certain specific trade matters where a court comes to the conclusion 
that provinces are incapable of regulating them efficiently. According to 
the reasoning expounded in Kitkatla Band, the factual underpinnings of a 
claim of inefficiency must therefore be established by the party alleging 
it. And to paraphrase LeBel J., because of this assertion of inefficiency, 
the nature and quality of the evidence offered will have to be assessed 
and discussed. Such a claim will have to be established on a balance of 
probabilities, by persuasive evidence. Even more so in a context where, 
once proven, such inefficiency will endow Parliament with jurisdiction to 
legislate over matters that traditionally fell within the provinces’ exclu-
sive sphere of power.  
Upon what kind of evidence did Dickson C.J.C. rely, in City National 
Leasing, to recognize to the central government a power over the regula-
tion of intra- and extraprovincial competition? What kind of evidence was 
adduced to establish provincial incapacity to regulate efficiently?  
Two doctrinal sources were invoked. Most striking about these is 
their purely normative content. The long excerpt taken from the first 
one172 written by Peter W. Hogg and Warren Grover,173 begins as follows: 
“It is surely obvious that major regulation of the Canadian economy has 
to be national.” It then goes on enumerating a number of very general 
assertions of the following type: “Goods and services, and the cash or 
credit which purchases them, flow freely from one part of the country to 
another without regard for provincial boundaries”; “[a]n over-all national 
policy is the key to efficiency in the production of goods and services”; 
“[a]ny attempt to achieve an optimal distribution of economic activity 
must transcend provincial boundaries”; “with few exceptions, any indi-
vidual or corporation, including a provincially incorporated corporation, 
has the capacity to ‘walk across’ provincial boundaries in order to buy or 
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sell, lend or borrow, hire or fire,” etc. A predictable conclusion ensues 
from all this: “the market for goods and services is competitive on a na-
tional basis, and provincial legislation cannot be an effective regulator”. 
As for the second study, it is even more prescriptive than the first, if 
possible. The first two lines of the quote174 taken from A.E. Safarian’s 
Canadian Federalism and Economic Integration say it all: “Competition 
policy can be used most effectively to support the common market if it is 
within federal power. With mobility of goods, it is quite unrealistic to 
attempt to maintain diverse provincial competition policies.”175 In the 
words of Karazivan and Gaudreault-DesBiens:  
These statements are general observations on interprovincial 
integration; they do not allow targeting a specific line of argument 
related to effectiveness in either qualitative or quantitative terms. More 
specifically, neither the positive added-value of federal legislation nor 
the negative aspects of provinces’ inability to regulate the field were 
substantiated; that is, the provinces’ incapacity to regulate the field has 
not been demonstrated, nor have the federal government’s superior 
abilities in the field been proven.176 
In point of fact, the authors’ assertions are normative statements 
founded on the belief of the provinces’ ontological incapacity to work for 
the economic good of Canada as a whole. Normative statements 
morphed by Dickson C.J.C. into empirical truths.177 After referring to the 
above mentioned quotes, he concludes that “[i]t is evident from this dis-
cussion that competition cannot be effectively regulated unless it is 
regulated nationally.”178 
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In Kirkbi, the Supreme Court considered whether the civil action for 
passing off in section 7(b) of the Trade-marks Act is a valid exercise of 
the GRT power. The validity of the Act was not directly challenged by 
the parties, and the Court seemed to assume, with little discussion, that 
the Act a whole was valid. The few comments that LeBel J. did make on 
behalf of the Court suggest that normative assumptions similar to those 
operating in City National Leasing shaped the Court’s views on the va-
lidity of the Trade-marks Act pursuant to the GRT power: 
The Trade-marks Act is clearly concerned with trade as a whole, as 
opposed to within a particular industry. There is no question that trade-
marks apply across and between industries in different provinces. 
Divided provincial and federal jurisdiction could mean that the 
provincial law could be changed by each provincial legislature. This 
could result in unregistered trade-marks that were more strongly 
protected than registered trade-marks, undermining the efficacy and 
integrity of the federal Parliament’s Trade-marks Act. The lack of a 
civil remedy integrated into the scheme of the Act, applicable to all 
marks, registered or unregistered, might also lead to duplicative or 
conflicting and hence inefficient enforcement procedures 
… if trade-marks are intended to protect the goodwill or reputation 
associated with a particular business and to prevent confusion in the 
marketplace, then a comprehensive scheme dealing with both registered 
and unregistered trade-marks is necessary to ensure adequate 
protection.179  
As explained already, my thesis is that the nature of GRT calls for a 
much more substantial burden of proof. Such power being ontologically 
linked to the existence of provincial inefficiency, then efficiency’s logic 
must be played to the hilt. If Parliament is to win the day, it must estab-
lish on a balance of probabilities, by persuasive evidence, that the failure 
to include one or more provinces or localities in its legislative scheme 
would jeopardize the efficient regulation of securities in Canada as a 
                                                                                                             
government. Given the free flow of trade across provincial borders guaranteed by s. 121 
of the Constitution Act, 1867 Canada is, for economic purposes, a single huge market-
place. If competition is to be regulated at all it must be regulated federally. This fact leads 
to the syllogism cited by Hogg and Grover, [supra, note 173] at p. 200:  
... regulation of the competitive sector of the economy can be effectively accomplished 
only by federal action. If there is no federal power to enact a competition policy, then 
Canada cannot have a competition policy. The consequence of a denial of federal con-
stitutional power is therefore, in practical effect, a gap in the distribution of legislative 
powers. This is certainly untrue as regards securities. 
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whole. This is especially so in a context where provinces have, for a long 
time, been constitutionally endowed with power over the litigious matter. 
In any case, the City National Leasing decision should be used pru-
dently.180 It is worth recalling that this decision was concerned only with 
a very limited issue: the constitutional validity of a private remedy estab-
lished under the Combines Investigation Act.181 Similarly, in Kirkbi the 
constitutional validity of a civil remedy was at issue; the parties did not 
challenge the Trade-marks Act as a whole.182 In addition, contrary to se-
curities, neither competition nor trade marks has ever been the subject of 
full-fledged and systematic provincial regulation. The case for provincial 
inefficiency was therefore made that much easier to argue.  
From what has been established up to now, we can conclude the fol-
lowing: although Parliament is most certainly competent over the inter-
provincial and international aspects of the securities trade, for this power 
to be extended to the intraprovincial dimensions of the latter, a rigorous 
empirical demonstration of provincial inefficiency should be mandatory.  
As we will see in the final section, avenues of solution do exist to 
properly divide up power where concurrent authority is concerned.  
(c) Efficiency and Subsidiarity183  
Under the umbrella of the Maastricht Treaty a great number of con-
current powers are recognized to the European Union and its member 
states. And so as to ensure that “decisions are taken as closely as possible 
to the citizen”,184 paragraph 5(3) of Title I of the Consolidated version of 
the Treaty on European Union185 provides: 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the 
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objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but 
can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved at Union level. 
Interestingly, although subsidiarity can lead to recognition to the Un-
ion of greater latitude in the exercise of a concurrent power, as appears 
from a reading of paragraph 5(3), it does not automatically endow the 
Union with the entirety of the said power. Indeed, in conformity with the 
principle of proportionality, the latter power will be granted “only if and 
insofar as” the member states’ incapacity justifies it.186 
The functional test established under paragraph 5(3) of the Treaty on 
European Union bears a close resemblance to Dickson C.J.C.’s “provin-
cial incapacity” criterion — with a twist, however. Whereas the Canadian 
version allows for the mobilization of purely rhetorical and normative 
arguments in the establishment of provincial incapacity, a much more 
rigorous system for monitoring the application of the subsidiarity and 
proportionality principles is provided in the Protocol (No. 2) on the Ap-
plication of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.187 
First of all, before proposing European legislative acts, the European 
Commission, it is said, “shall consult widely” (section 2) and such con-
sultations “shall, where appropriate, take into account the regional and 
local dimension of the action envisaged” (id.). Drafts of European legis-
lative acts need to be forwarded to national Parliaments (section 4) and 
must contain a detailed statement making it possible to appraise compli-
ance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (section 5). 
Finally, and most importantly for the purpose of our discussion, this last 
provision specifies that “[t]he reasons for concluding that a Union objec-
tive can be better achieved at Union level shall be substantiated by 
qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators.”188 Conse-
quently, not only shall persuasive empirical evidence be necessary to 
prove the Union’s claim, but the proportionality principle will also enjoin 
that proof be made of the difficulty or impossibility of achieving volun-
tary collaboration between the member states.189 The “credibility of 
cooperation” test establishes that, in situations where the need to act in 
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common has been established, centralization is not required when volun-
tary cooperation among Member States is credible.  
The Supreme Court of Canada might therefore find some guidance in 
the European approach just described, especially since it has twice re-
ferred, in the recent past, to the principle of subsidiarity, a principle it 
defined as “the proposition [according to which] law-making and imple-
mentation are often best achieved at a level of government that is not 
only effective, but also closest to the citizens affected and thus most re-
sponsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, and to population 
diversity”.190 The European approach certainly raises a number of diffi-
culties. However, it provides a credible methodology to assess issues of 
efficiency and to limit the reach of the central government’s power over 
intraprovincial securities regulation. It also provides an answer to the 
question of how the conflict between a valid federal securities legislation 
and its valid provincial counterparts would be settled. Assuming that 
GRT is found to provide Parliament with power to regulate all aspects of 
the Canadian securities market, what of the fate of the provincial regula-
tory system now in place? 
Under the double aspect doctrine, the constitutional validity of this 
system could not be questioned. But could the central government go as 
far as proposed by the Hockin Report191 and provide that, following a 
transition period of two years’ duration after the adoption of a national 
legislation, all provincial securities legislation would be repealed? 
Favouring as it does192 the recourse to an “operational conflict” 
rather than to an “occupied field” test to determine whether federal  
paramountcy is engaged, the Supreme Court might be hesitant to pro-
nounce provincial securities legislation inoperable. The end result would 
be a deep and maybe complicated intertwinement of federal and provin-
cial legislation.  
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If, on the other hand, the methodological approach proposed here 
were ever to be adopted, this conflict issue might be deflated. Once 
credible demonstration has been made that federal intervention would 
indeed guarantee greater efficiency in the securities market, it would fall 
to reason that the continued application of provincial legislation “would 
frustrate the purpose of the federal law”.193 However, the simple asser-
tion of the existence of a conflict would not suffice to bring about a 
conclusion of inoperability. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The regulation of securities in a federal state is a complex question. 
But then federalism is a complex system that acknowledges the intricate 
nature of our modern lives. The avenues of solution described here all 
emphasize the need to bestow a complementary jurisdiction upon both 
the federal and provincial levels of government. They do so because in-
cantatory assertions about the virtues of strict uniformity or radical 
decentralization belie the empirical reality of the tightly woven nature of 
the extraprovincial and intraprovincial facets of the securities sector. 
The temptation will be great for the Supreme Court of Canada to 
abide by the wishes of the proponents of uniformity. However, caution 
should prevail. What for the present looks like a strictly economic ques-
tion could easily transmute itself into an all-out identitary battle. If weak 
arguments based on a flimsy test of provincial incapacity are resorted to 
by the Supreme Court to justify federal encroachments upon the provin-
cial power over securities, not only will the legitimacy of the federal 
intervention be questioned, but so will the legitimacy of the Court it-
self.194 Indeed, one should never forget that considerations of efficiency 
always bring the following question to the fore: efficient for whom? The 
national or the local community?  
The better solution might be to simply jettison GRT as the constitu-
tional basis of federal intervention in securities matters. To guarantee a 
complementary instead of a plenary role to Parliament in such matters, 
one avenue, as I said before,195 would be to ground federal legislation in 
the central government’s jurisdiction over extraprovincial commercial 
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matters and its jurisdiction over extraterritorial issues. In this way, Par-
liament could, for instance, contribute to the success of a passport system 
that would allow a market participant to choose a primary jurisdiction of 
his or her choice. As mentioned earlier, for this choice to be respected, 
Parliament could, by means of a referential legislation scheme, ensure 
that the selected regulatory regime would be applicable all over the coun-
try. These two heads of power, defined in more conceptual than 
functional terms, have the undeniable advantage of not being based on 
any notion of efficiency. 
In a word, if this sheep is not to look like a ram, courts will have to 
be as imaginative as the Little Prince. 
  
